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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES,

]

Petitioner and Appellant,

;
i

Priority No. 3

vs.
GARY DELAND, and M. ELDON
BARNES

|1
]

Respondents.

Case No. 890722-CA

]

JURISDICTION
Mr. Humphries filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, which was dismissed by order of the district court on
November 13, 1989.

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to

decide this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(g) of the Utah
Judicial Code (Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g) (Supp. 1989).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the Order of the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, dismissing petitioner's writ of
habeas corpus.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The primary issue on appeal is whether the district
court has authority to review the actions taken by the Board of
Pardons at Mr. Humphries1 parole eligibility hearing.

Decision

on this issue is reached by considering the following collateral
issues:

022390. mb.ejs.apbrief.hum
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1.

Does Mr• Humphries have a right of due process, as

guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, at the Board
of Pardons parole eligibility hearing?
2.

Does Mr. Humphries have a right of due process, as

guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of Utah, at the Board
of Pardons parole eligibility hearing?
3.

Were the actions of the Board of Pardons at Mr.

Humphries' parole eligibility hearing violative of the Utah
enabling statutes under which the Board operates?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The following U.S. and Utah constitutional provisions
are determinative:
U.S. CONSTITUTION - AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONSTITUTION - AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
022390.mb.ep.apbrief.hum
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Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."
Article VII, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah.
[Board of pardons • - Respites and reprieves.]
Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor,
Justices f the Supreme Court and Attorney General shall
constitute a Board of Pardons, a majority of whom,
including the Governor, upon such conditions, and with
such limitations and restrictions as they deem proper,
may remit fines and forfeitures, commute punishments,
and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases
except treason and impeachments, subject to such
regulations as may be provided by law, relative to the
manner of applying for pardons; but no fine or
forfeiture shall be remitted, and no commutation or
pardon granted, except after a full hearing before the
Board, in open session, after previous notice of the
time and place of such hearing has been given. The
proceedings and decisions of the Board with the reasons
therefor in each case, together with the dissent of any
member who may disagree, shall be reduced to writing,
and filed with all papers used upon the hearing, in the
office of the Secretary of State.
The Governor shall have power to grant respites or
reprieves in all cases of convictions for offenses
against the State, except treason or conviction on
impeachment; but such respites or reprieves shall not
extend beyond the next session of the Board of Pardons;
and such Board, at such session, shall continue or
determine such respite or reprieve, or they may commute
the punishment, or pardon the offense as herein
provided. In case of conviction for treason, the
Governor shall have the power to suspend execution of
the sentence, until the case shall be reported to the
Legislature at its next regular session, when the
Legislature shall either pardon, or commute the
sentence, or direct its execution; he shall communicate
to the Legislature at each regular session, each case
of remission of fine or forfeiture, reprieve,
commutation or pardon granted since the last previous
report, stating the name of the convict, the crime for
which he was convicted, the sentence and its date, the
date of remission, commutation, pardon or reprieve,
with the reasons for granting the same, and the
022390.mb.ejs.apbrief.hum
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objections, if any, of any member of the Board made
thereto.
Section 77-27-5(3) of the Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure, set forth below, is also determinative:
The determinations and decisions of the Board of
Pardons in cases involving approval or denial or any
action, of paroles, pardons, commutations or
terminations of sentence, orders of restitution, or
remission of fines, forfeitures, and restitution, are
final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing
in this section prevents the obtaining of enforcement
of a civil judgment*
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Humphries filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, challenging the
Board of Pardons actions in determining his parole date at his
eligibility hearing on March 24, 1989.
Course of Proceedings
This appeal is from the Order of the district court
dismissing petitioner's writ of habeas corpus.

Mr. Humphries was

convicted of issuing a bad check by the Second Judicial District
Court, Davis County.

Mr. Humphries filed a pro se petition for

writ of habeas corpus in May of 1989, seeking a determination
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his
criminal trial, that he was denied compulsory process at trial,
that the evidence at his trial was insufficient to establish his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he was denied due
process of law at his eligibility parole hearing before the Board
022390.mb.ejs.apbrief.hum
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of Pardons when it considered inaccurate information as to Mr.
Humphries' prior criminal record in setting his parole date.
The State filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Humphries'
petition on May 22, 1989, and a supplemental motion to dismiss on
June 28, 1989.

Following a hearing before Judge Noel on August

25, 1989, the State's motion to dismiss was granted as to every
issue but the Board of Pardons denial of due process issue.
Following the submission of written memoranda by
counsel as to the remaining portion of the State's motion to
dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the district
court dismissed Mr. Humphries' petition by order dated
November 13, 1989.
Disposition at District Court
The State's motion to dismiss Mr. Humphries' Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus was granted.

The district court's

minute entry dated October 24, 1989, noted that "Section 77-275(3) Utah Code Annotated prevents the Court from reviewing the
decision of the Board of Pardons, as Petitioner is here asking
the Court to do.

For this reason and for the reasons stated in

Respondents' memo the motion to dismiss is granted."
ARGUMENT
Summary of Argument
The Board of Pardons actions in considering two prior
felony convictions erroneously indicated on Mr. Humphries' prior
criminal record in determining Mr. Humphries' parole date were
violative of his rights of due process under the United States

022390./nb.ejs.apbriefJium
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and Utah constitutions.

Those same actions constitute violations

by the Board of Pardons of the State statutes that create and
empower the Board of Pardons.
The district court has the fundamental authority and
duty to review the Board of Pardons actions to decide these
constitutional and statutory questions.

Section 77-27-5(3) of

the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure does not preclude review of
Board of Pardon actions that impinge on constitutional
protections nor those actions that constitute violations of the
State's enabling statutes.
The State was not entitled to dismissal of the habeas
corpus petition without an evidentiary hearing at which Mr.
Humphries could establish that his parole date was
inappropriately lengthened when the Board of Pardons improperly
considered and relied on an inaccurate history of Mr. Humphries1
prior criminal convictions.
I.

Mr. Humphries had a Right of Due Process Under the U.S.
Constitution at his Board of Pardons Parole Eligibility
Hearing.
When a state adopts a parole system, it may create an

expectancy of release which is worthy of Federal due process
protection (the so-called "liberty interest").

See, e.g., Board

of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 96 L.Ed. 2d 303, 107 S.Ct.
2415 (1987) (the Montana parole scheme created a liberty interest
protected by the due process clause); Greenholtz v. Inmates of
the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 60 L.Ed.
2d 668, 99 S.Ct. 2100 (1979) (the Nebraska statute under review
022390.mb.ejs.apbrief.hum
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created an expectancy of release entitle to some constitutional
protection).
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals
has yet decided whether the Utah parole system creates due
process protections for inmates at the parole eligibility hearing
stage.

However, this Court has approached the issue previously.

In White v. Board of Pardons, 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (July 31,
1989), the Court, in dismissing a writ of mandamus petition to
review the Board of Pardon's decision as frivolous, carefully
noted:

"Under the circumstances of this case, petitioner has not

demonstrated that the Boardfs actions violate a substantial
constitutional right."

(emphasis added).

The Court has left the

door open to consider the constitutional rights afforded by the
parole system.
Examining the Utah parole scheme in light of the
statutes reviewed by the Supreme Court in Greenholtz and Allen,
the Utah statute grants the Board of Pardons broad discretion in
administering the parole system.

So too do the Nebraska and

Montana statutes reviewed in Greenholtz and Allen.

As the Court

in Greenholtz noted, the Nebraska parole statute is lenient in
its notice and hearing provisions and does not require a
submission of all evidence on which the board of pardons makes
its decision.

By contrast, the Utah Constitution requires its

Board of Pardons to hold hearings "in open session, after
previous notice of the time and place of such hearing has been
given.

The proceedings and decisions of the Board, with the

022390.mb.ejs.apbrief.hum
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reasons therefor in each case . . . shall be reduced to writing,
and filed with all papers used upon the hearing . . . ."

Article

VII, Section 12, Constitution of Utah.
This distinction in the Utah law, requiring full
disclosure and reasoned decisions in Board of Pardon
deliberations, is critically important in assessing the "liberty
interest" of an inmate in parole eligibility hearings.
Supreme Court in Greenholtz stated:

As the

"It is axiomatic that due

process fis flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands.f . . . The function of legal
process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in
the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous
decisions."

442 U.S. at 12-13 (citations omitted).

The State of Utah has placed the highest value it can,
inclusion in the State's Constitution, on having a complete
record of all information considered by the Board of Pardons in
its hearings.

Further, the Board must make its decisions in

writing, "with the reasons therefor."

The very concept of full

disclosure and reasoned opinions carries with it the requirement
that evidence before the Board be as accurate as possible, and
the judicial system has found that accuracy is promoted by
granting interested parties the right to confront and correct
inaccuracies.

From that accuracy of information, inmates

naturally expect fair and evenhanded treatment from the Board in
establishing parole dates.

If the information is inaccurate,

inmates have a right, a fundamental right of due process, to
022390.mb.ejs.apbrief.hum
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correct the record, to confront the inaccuracies, in the hope of
receiving a fair parole date.

That is a liberty interest

protected by the Federal Constitution, and created by the Utah
parole system.
II.

Mr. Humphries had a Right of Due Process Under the Utah
Constitution at his Board of Pardons Parole Eligibility
Hearing.
Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah

provides that

lf

[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, o

property, without due process of law."

While State due process

requirements must at least meet Federal due process standards,
there is not prohibition against providing additional due proces
protections.
In Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (1989), the Utah
Supreme Court, in discussing factors that could justify
successive petitions for writ of habeas corpus, noted the
"fundamental unfairness" factor.
explained:

In a footnote the court

"The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit apparently believes that our 'fundamental unfairness1
ground is a constitutional due process ground. . . . It is not
that.

There can be occasions where a trial was infected with a

fundamental unfairness that would not meet federal due process
standards."

Id. at 1037 n. 10 (citation omitted).

Similar reasoning can be used by this Court to find
that the Board of Pardons consideration of inaccurate informatio
in determining Mr. Humphries1 eligibility for parole violated a
"fundamental unfairness" test, whether or not Federal due proces
022390.mb.ejs.apbnefJrum
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rights were violated.

Whether the test is denoted State

procedural due process or common law, it should be invoked to
protect the integrity of the parole hearing process, particularly
in light of the State's avowed interest in complete and accurate
information being before the Board of Pardons.
III. The Board of Pardons' Actions Were in Violation of State
Statutes.
The Board's actions in considering false prior criminal
records and refusing to allow Mr. Humphries to refute the false
information, as alleged by Mr. Humphries, are violative of the
Board's enabling statutes.

The State's motion to dismiss assumed

the accuracy of Mr. Humphries' allegations.

The propriety of

court review of Board of Pardon decisions, and the necessity of
the Board's abiding by the statutes creating it, were both
reinforced by the recent decision of Andrews v. Haun, 779 P.2d
229 (1989).

In Andrews, the Utah Supreme Court held that the

Board of Pardons erred by not disclosing certain documents that
were before it as required by Section 12 of Article VII of the
Utah Constitution.
Even in the face of Andrews, the State argued
(successfully at the district court) that, as a matter of law,
Mr. Humphries has no protectible interest in the accuracy of
information before the Board at his parole eligibility hearing
and has no forum in which he can challenge the Board's action in
giving weight to the inaccurate information in rendering their
parole eligibility decision.

022390.mb.ejs.apbrief.hum
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reasoning is that, while the Constitution requires full
disclosure of all information relied upon by the Board of Pardons
in rendering its decisions, that information can be completely
erroneous and no illegality has occurred and no recourse lies for
the decision rendered on the basis of the erroneous information.
That cannot be the law.
Conclusion
The courts have the authority and the responsibility to
review Board of Pardon decisions when those decisions are made in
violation of an inmate's right of due process or when they
involve violation by the Board of its State statutory and
constitutional mandate.

Mr. Humphries is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing to test the validity of his claims.
DATED:

February 26, 1990.
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.

BY I . \<^L . ^ ^ J t J U i
E. Jay JSheeij
Attorneys for Thomas R.
Humphries, Petitioner
and Appellant
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foregoing Brief of Petitioner to:
R. Paul Van Dam
Kent M. Barry
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
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